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“What If ... Charlemagne’s Other Sons had survived?” 
Charlemagne’s Sons and the Problems of Royal 
Succession 
Elke Ohnacker ∗ 
Abstract: »Antifaktisches Denken: Was wäre, wenn ... die anderen Söhne 
Karls des Großen überlebt hätten? Die Söhne Karls des Großen und Probleme 
der Herrschaftsnachfolge«. The article is concerned with the problem of Early 
Medieval royal succession in different circumstances: the death of two of 
Charlemagne’s designated heirs in 810 and 811, the succession of Louis the 
Pious in 814 and the conflicts between Louis and his sons resulting in Louis’s 
deposition in 833 and the division of the Carolingian Empire. Counterfactuals 
are employed in the interpretation of the events surrounding and leading up to 
the central political and legal problems of royal and imperial succession. Ask-
ing questions like “What if ... event x would not have taken place?” and – if 
possible – developing likely and less likely scenarios proves to be a valuable 
tool of historic research, especially with regard to the Early Middle Ages’ 
grave lack of written sources. The overall effect of a methodic use of counter-
factuals in this form is a d-construction or what still may be seen as a “logical 
succession” of events.  
Keywords: royal/imperial succession, legitimacy, power, conflict, writing, 
written sources, written administration.  
On January 28th 814, Charlemagne died at the age of 72. His son Louis the 
Pious succeeded his father into kingship and empire. Long before Louis died in 
840, the kingship had been contested amongst his sons. This conflict peaked in 
the deposition of Louis 833 and, later, in the division of the Frankish empire 
formulated in the treaty of Verdun, in 843. But, taken the collective mentality 
of Early Medieval Elites, Louis the Pious’s sons were neither particularly 
greedy nor exceedingly belligerent. Rivalries between brothers, fathers and 
sons, the offspring of women married to or allied with the same king, etc. were 
omnipresent in these times. Conflicts were violent and frequently resulted in 
war, political assassination, the disfigurement of opponents, banishment into 
monasteries and exile, etc.1  
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Elke Ohnacker, FB Geschichte/Lehrstuhl Signori, Fach D2, 
Universität Konstanz, Brauneggerstr. 78, 78462 Konstanz, Germany;  
e-mail: elke.ohnacker@gmx.de.  
1  Charlemagne himself was confronted with this problem in his own family history. Not only 
did he have a powerful rival in the person of his brother Karlmann. His uncle, who carried 
the same name, tried to contest his father Pippin III.’s position until he died in 754. 
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Amongst Charlemagne’s sons, four were treated as potential successors, 
Pippin the Hunchback, Karl the Younger, Karlmann/Pippin2 and Louis. Apart 
from Pippin the Hunchback’s revolt, the written sources do not mention con-
flicts between these brothers, them and Charlemagne’s other sons, or between 
father and sons. But the written sources we have got are few and often biased. 
In historical situations which are but sparsely documented by sources of any 
kind, it is necessary to analyse these sources closely. Comparing the issues in 
question with what happened before and after can lead to a more detailed view. 
Furthermore, questions which are capable to break open the often fragmentary 
chronologies of events which are typical for the Early Middle Ages, like the 
question “What if ... event x would not have taken place?” or: “... would have 
taken place at an earlier or a later date?” offer a wide range of possibilities to 
analyse certain phenomena more closely. The development of alternative sce-
narios can as well reduce the risk of being trapped in teleological interpreta-
tions suggested by a chronological succession of events. In the perspective of 
the historian it is imperative to keep in mind that a given succession of events 
need not be the result of causality. Thus, in order to answer the question “What 
if ... Karl and Karlmann/Pippin had survived their father?” we have to include 
two preliminary steps: analysing the characteristics of the written sources and 
the information they give and comparing characteristical problems of kings, 
their sons, and the conflicts about royal succession reaching back into Merov-
ingian times.  
1. Sources and Methods 
Research on the history of Western Europe in the Early Middle Ages is subject 
to a crucial problem: the lack of writing. During the rule of Charlemagne and 
his successors, the developments in culture and administration, later summa-
rised under the term “Carolingian Renaissance”, resulted in the production of 
more written sources. This does not mean many. Research on events in high 
politics suffers gravely from this problem, let alone the history of the common 
people who were still further away from the focus of these sources. Interpreta-
tion is made still more difficult by the fact that an overwhelming majority of 
their authors were clerics, dealing out harsh criticism on the lay society sur-
rounding them, which did seldom conform to Christian norms and ethics. If a 
ruler like Charlemagne was interested in introducing different forms of written 
documents as new techniques of rulership and administration, it is to be ex-
pected that these written sources – be it records or narrations – were produced 
                                                             
2  Charlemagne’s second son from Hildegard was first named Karlmann. After the unsuccess-
ful revolt of his elder step-brother Pippin (781-82) he was given the dynastic name of Pip-
pin.  
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by men who worked and wrote in the ruler’s sphere of interest and often owed 
him their splendid careers. Modern categories like “objectivity” and “plurality” 
(of interpretations) are not to be looked for in these texts.  
Thus, a critical methodological approach towards such sources is impera-
tive. The long-term development of techniques of interpreting medieval sources 
comprises historiographical as well as semantic and semiotic methods, interdis-
ciplinary approaches, etc. Many of these methods, like the Annales-School’s 
integration of interdisciplinary concepts into mediaevistic research, have 
fiercely been disputed in their time (Raphael 1994, 59 ff., 393 ff.). However, 
counterfactuals and counterfactual thinking are rarely perceived as scientific 
tools enlarging the stock of refined and interdisciplinary methods. Although the 
question “What would have happened, if ... ?” might occasionally come up in 
informal circles, it is rarely asked seriously, especially not in published re-
search in a market where such an approach might be used to question the au-
thor’s scientific credibility. In spite of a wide-spread reluctance, counterfactual 
thinking can be a valuable tool of mediaevistic research, especially for the 
Early Middle Ages.  
Marc Bloch encouraged the historian to always be attentive to what might 
be hidden under the seductively evident surface of sources, “facts” and “com-
mon knowledge” (Bloch 1974, 151 ff.). Counterfactuals can invert what we 
think to know and thus improve our insight into historical phenomena. How-
ever, to avoid “wild” speculation leading to doubtful results, counterfactual 
thinking requires a critical approach. Questions like “What would have hap-
pened in the case of an alien attack on Christmas 800?” (when Charlemagne 
was about to be crowned as emperor) are only slightly less to the point than 
asking: “Was Charlemagne French or German?”, a topic raised during the 
nationalist euphoria in 19th century France and Germany3 and reaching another 
infamous peak in Nazi Germany (Hampe, 1935). Charlemagne, who lived in an 
age when extraterrestrial activity was strictly limited to agents of the Christian 
god, and when the modern states of “France” and “Germany” were not yet 
existing, would not have understood either question.  
The condition for a historian asking counterfactual questions and, at the 
same time, avoiding anachronisms and ethnocentrisms resulting from a modern 
point of view, is the thorough knowledge of the historical society in question, 
its structural characteristics, social practices, norms, forms of knowledge and 
understanding etc. The characteristics and many-layered problems of royal 
succession in Early Carolingian and Merovingian society form a field where 
counterfactual questions can lead to interesting insights. The kingdoms of Early 
Medieval Western Europe, different as they may have been in many aspects of 
                                                             
3  Although the image of Charlemagne in French and German nationalist discourse has be-
come a subject of research in itself (cf. Erkens 1999), popular perception does not seem to 
have changed.  
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their development, show certain common characteristics concerning rulership 
and royal succession. Legitimate as well as illegitimate sons might succeed to 
the throne (Hagn, 2006, 192 ff.). Having several kings and dividing kingdoms 
was a widespread phenomenon, especially in the Merovingian realm (Schnei-
der 1972, 73 ff.). Having designated successors acclaimed as (sub-) kings, once 
they came of age (at the age of c. 15), and giving them military commands of 
their own was common practice. The king’s sons tended to be in a privileged 
position concerning royal succession but were not the only candidates possible. 
Marriages and re-marriages4 amongst the elites, as well as endemic poligamy, 
frequently led to relatively large groups of potential candidates, each of whom 
was claiming his superior right to the throne. The chaotic feuding which could 
result from such constellations is vivid in Gregory of Tours’ and the Pseudo-
Fredegar’s descriptions of Merovingian society in the 6th, 7th and 8th centu-
ries. It is easy for the modern observer to interpret such a description as de-
structive, as typical for the “dark ages”, or even as agonal (Scheibelreiter 1999, 
236-237). Here it is important to overcome the rhetoric of Roman civility dis-
played by a clerical member of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy who, like Greg-
ory, described the new barbarian lords’ politics. The catalogue of political 
deficits of a degenerating Merovingian kingship that the author of the Pseudo-
Fredegar’s continuationes emphasises5 draws a different, but equally biased, 
picture. But, violent as these conflicts might have been, having several candi-
dates for the throne served an important social purpose: supplying a surplus of 
qualified potential successors in a time when people died young and when a 
king’s offspring might not survive him.  
There were several strategies of limiting down the number of candidates for 
the throne. Recourse to violence was frequent. Chlovis I., the first Catholic 
king of the Franks, considerably expanded the Merovingian realm and secured 
his single kingship, as well as the division of the realm amongst his sons ac-
cording to his will by killing off whoever might have stood in his way6. Apart 
from assassinating competitors, exiling them or banning them into monasteries 
and cutting their hair, thus depriving them of their symbol of rulership, the 
                                                             
4  Divorces seem to have been as common as the existence of concubines or explicit bigamy 
in spite of religious norms, albeit the clerical authors of our sources, for obvious reasons, 
tend to play down this part of the social life. The common practice of marrying the divorced 
or widowed former spouse of a king or royal successor who already had children from this 
alliance(s) and having children with her makes it appear even more chaotic for the modern 
observer.  
5  The continationes were commissioned by duke Childebrand, a half-brother of Karl Martell 
and an uncle of Pippin III., and his son Nibelung. Their strong emphasis on the legitimacy 
of the power to come is not surprising. 
6  Gregory wrote that Clovis had ordered other kings as well as his close kin to be killed to 
prevent them from competing his status. The latter even ordered a treacherous search for 
surviving kinsmen, under the pretext of being alone and helpless, to make sure that nobody 
survived (Gregory, Ten Books of Histories/Historiarum Libri Decem, II, 42)  
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crinis7, were frequent methods of doing away with less successful candidates. 
Another efficient corrective concerning the number and qualification of candi-
dates was to be found outside the King’s family (stirps regia). Even powerful 
kings were not capable to rule alone but, to a considerable extent, depended on 
aristocratic co-operation and on their ability to create consent between them 
and the aristocracy. Claiming the kingship depended on aristocratic support. 
Candidates who did not succeed in pulling a significant part of the kingdom’s 
magnates on their side were out of the game.  
2. Pippin III., Charlemagne and Their Unsuccessful 
Brothers  
When Pippin III. deposed the last Merovingian king Childeric III. in 751, he 
did away with a dynasty, not with practices of ruling and ensuring power. Po-
litical opposition was eliminated by the usual methods: forced conversion to 
monasticism, imprisonment (often in out-of-the-way monasteries), exile, blind-
ing and murder. In Pippin’s family, the office of mayor of the palace was con-
tested between the different heirs. Karl Martell had three sons: the brothers 
Pippin and Karlmann, sharing their father’s office of mayor of the palace, and 
Grifo, a younger brother who had inherited Aquitaine. In 741 Pippin and 
Karlmann joined forces to deprive Grifo of his inheritance (Fredegar, Cont. a. 
741). By banning his brother Karlmann (who died in 754 under suspicious 
circumstances (Nelson 2004, 103)) into a monastery at Sorakte near Rome, and 
later Montecassino, he secured the succession of his sons Karl and Karlmann. 
After Pippin’s death in 768, Charlemagne and his brother Karlmann found 
themselves in the same situation. The rivalry between the brothers seemed to 
have been deeply rooted and omnipresent8, only ending with the death of 
Karlmann (771). Given the ruthlessness of Charlemagne’s actions against aris-
tocratic opposition, it might be guessed that Karlmann was spared his uncle’s 
fate by early death.  
These were not the only similarities between father and son. Charlemagne as 
well as Pippin III. were bent on improving their status and political power: 
Pippin rose from a high royal office to the kingship, Charlemagne was crowned 
emperor in Rome (Christmas 800). Given the social and political climate of the 
time, heirs might be expected to try and get more than their share and not be 
                                                             
7  The crinis is a hair-knot worn on the forehead, distinguishing the Frankish king from his 
people. The Liber Historiae Francorum claims that, from the time of the election of the 
(mythical) first Frankish king, the Franks were ruled by reges criniti. (Liber Historiae 
Francorum, 344).  
8  Eginhard, Charlemagne’s biographer, avoids the acknowledgement of a deep-rooted rivalry 
between the brothers, so unfitting for a panegyric. For him, this conflict was due to the ef-
forts of Karlmann and his followers to disturb peace and unity (Eginhard Vita, c. 3). 
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too scrupulous about it. But, would the events of 751 and 800 have been possi-
ble if both Pipppin III. and Charlemagne had not first ensured that they held 
their position alone? Given the problem of aristocratic support, the legal aspect 
that the emperor’s title could not be as easily divided as a kingdom, and, last 
but not least, the considerable risk of either action, both events would probably 
not have taken place had the respective brothers kept their share of the inheri-
tance.  
Charlemagne had eight wives, numerous concubines and surviving children 
from most of these alliances. Eginhard describes his great attachment towards 
his children, especially towards his daughters, in terms exceeding the topical 
formulae reserved for the ideal prince. The education of the royal offspring, 
legitimate or illegitimate, seems to have been thorough. Unlike their father and 
most members of the lay elites, sons and daughters were taught to read and 
write and were educated in the liberal arts. Quite a-typical, Charlemagne did 
not wish his daughters, excepting the eldest Rothrud9, to marry and had them 
stay in his household (Eginhard Vita, 19). Apart from the incestuous insinua-
tions this statement might awake, this information can also be explained differ-
ently: not allowing his daughters to marry and keeping them in his household, 
can also be seen as a means of narrowing down the number of potential succes-
sors – another question for which counterfactual thinking might prove new 
insights. The question “What if ... Charlemagne’s sons-in-law and their off-
spring had interfered in the politics of the realm?” clearly evokes even more 
rivalries, conflicts and political problems. To take this question further, one 
might well contemplate what would have happened if the planned marriage of 
Rothrud and the Byzantine Emperor had taken place. On the one hand, such an 
alliance might have been advantageous for both emperors, but, on the other 
hand, for this very reason such a match would probably be bitterly opposed by 
most of the Byzantine as well as the Frankish elites. This marriage would have 
happened before 80010 when Charlemagne was crowned emperor and deeply 
disturbed the diplomatic relations to Byzance. Would he, after this marriage, 
have claimed the emperor’s title as well? And if so, what would have been the 
politic consequences? The answers to these questions tend to be very specula-
tive, but an event which is seen as a crucial turning-point of European History 
(and which is still far from being sufficiently analysed11) might not have taken 
place. The resulting question “What would have happened, if the translatio 
imperii of 800 had not taken place?” is too complex and far-reaching to be 
answered even in an essay about counterfactuals.  
                                                             
9  Rothrud first was chosen to marry the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VI., a match which 
did not take place. Around 800 she married Rorico, the later Count of Maine (Boshof 1996, 
25).  
10  Cf. the previous note.  
11  Cf. Godman et. al. 2002. 
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The following sons of Charlemagne are mentioned in the written sources: 
Pippin the Hunchback, Charlemagne’s oldest illegitimate son, Karl the 
Younger, Karlmann/Pippin and Louis12 (sons of his second wife Hildegard), as 
well as three other natural sons, Drogo, Hugo, and Theoderic. Despite their 
illegitimate birth, the natural sons also carried dynastic names13, an indicator 
for their not being principally excluded from succession. Out of these sons, 
Pippin the Hunchback was the only one to revolt outright against his father in 
781/82. This revolt illustrates clearly the deficits of contemporary sources, the 
lack of our knowledge and the wide potential of “educated guesses” which 
have to be employed to achieve some more insight. Eginhard tells us that Pip-
pin, being seduced by “idle promises of the kingship” (Eginhard, Vita, c. 20), 
conspired with several unnamed magnates to depose his father. The conspiracy 
was discovered, its leaders punished and Pippin, due to his father clemently 
revoking capital punishment, was sent away to the monastery of Prüm (Egin-
hard Vita, c. 20). Like so often, we do not know what became of him. Only one 
relatively late source mentions him giving advice to his father about how to 
deal with other conspirators (Notker, Gesta II, 12). Charlemagne’s clemency in 
revoking capital punishment cannot be seen as a singular event. Suspending 
verdicts of capital punishment and clemently receiving back most of the perpe-
trators into royal grace was a frequently practised ritual in medieval politics 
(Althoff 1997, 99 ff.).  
When it comes to conspiracies against the king and the parties involved 
therein, showing clemency and sparing most of the participants might also have 
been a political necessity given the power and influence of the magnates in-
volved. What was clothed in the de-legitimising terms of rebellio, coniuratio, 
conspiratio, etc. (Brunner 1972, 14 ff.) could have been more seriously chal-
lenging the ruler’s status than the sources want to make us believe. This is 
especially important with regard to contemporary Carolingian sources written 
in the Carolingian kings’ chancellery and thus being far from neutral. Also, in 
these cases, the question might be asked: “What would have happened, if the 
king had not shown the expected clemency?” Could this have resulted in more 
uprisings amongst the magnates? Who the magnates of Pippin’s party were, 
what became of them after having been punished or received again into Char-
lemagne’s graces, what exactly their expectations in the case of Pippin’s suc-
cess might have been, is not known. Charlemagne’s motives of excluding a son 
from succession whom he had already been treating as a successor (Kasten 
1997, 139 ff.) are far from clear, too. That Pippin had been treated as a poten-
tial successor is proved by several donations which are consistent with what we 
know about how successors were provided for. Thus, Pippin’s position seemed 
                                                             
12  Louis being the surviving part of the twins Hildegard gave birth to in 778. The other 
brother, Lothar, presumably died in 799 (Boshof, 1996, 24).  
13  Cf. Drogo and Theoderic. On dynastic names, cf. Geuenich, 2006. 
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to have been based on more than “idle promises”. Kasten suggests that a dis-
ease resulting in the deformation of Pippin’s physical appearance at a later age 
might have been responsible for his exclusion from succession (Kasten 1997, 
139 ff.). Physical health and beauty were a basic condition for a ruler’s 
idoneity, a physical handicap thus might have been a reason for exclusion. 
However, on a praxeological level, Pippin does seem to have found allies 
amongst the magnates. Would this have been the case if his ability to become 
king had been principally scrutinised by his handicap? An indicator supporting 
this opinion is found in Eginhard’s Vita: Pippin is described as hunchbacked 
but having a beautiful face (Eginhard Vita, c. 20) – obviously Pippin was not 
completely devoid of the physical attributes of kingship. In this case, the ques-
tion “What if...?” might lead to a more detailed evaluation of the gap between 
theory and practice of rulership. “What if ... Pippin had not had this physical 
handicap?” Presumably, Pippin might have been treated as a successor in line 
with his three younger brothers. This would, in turn, have resulted in an in-
creased number of rivals. Four potential successors might, furthermore, have 
brought about even more violent conflicts because the common and convenient 
practice on such cases, i. e. forming an alliance with one rival to overpower the 
third party would not have worked any more. “What if ... Pippin and his party 
had been successful?” is a still more relevant question. Could this have resulted 
in the deposition of Charlemagne or in forcing him into a compromise concern-
ing his succession? Another possibility is that successful action against Char-
lemagne might have had a domino effect on other groups of the realm who 
were dissatisfied with their ruler. That these groups existed is beyond doubt14.  
3. The Sons of Hildegard 
Charlemagne wished his three sons by Hildegard (Karl the Younger, 
Karlmann/Pippin and Louis) to jointly inherit the Frankish Empire. That the 
division of the Empire during his life time could severely threaten his own 
power, he would have known only too well, given his own family history. 
Trying to make this division as water-proof as possible hardly comes as a sur-
prise. According to Frankish legal tradition, the division was proclaimed and 
accepted publicly in 806. Furthermore, a written version of the proceedings 
                                                             
14  For example, the deposition of the Bavarian duke Tassilo III. in 788 and the exilation of his 
family enlarged the circles of those who bore a grudge against the king. Also, Charle-
magne’s father Pippin III. had made himself a name for ruthlessly getting rid of anybody 
who stood in his way. The threat arising from dissatisfied magnates must have been consid-
erable, given the rash action of any ruler to suppress what the written sources call rebel-
liones or coniurationes. The oath of fidelity (789, renewed 802) Charlemagne demanded 
from all Frankish nobles and freemen after overthrowing the Thuringian magnate Hardrad’s 
conspiracy (786) only a few years after Pippin the hunchback’s revolt, can be seen as indi-
cators that Charlemagne’s lordship might not have been uncontested. 
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(the divisio regnorum) was compiled and one copy sent to the Pope. Before this 
date, the three brothers had already independently participated in politics, espe-
cially Karl who, since 784, had held his own military commands, mostly 
against the Danish invaders (Kasten 1997, 50, 55 ff.). In 806 all three were 
proclaimed sub-kings: Louis of Aquitaine, Karlmann/Pippin of Italy, Karl 
receiving the lands between Loire and Elbe. But the divisio regnorum avoids 
the central question. What was to become of the emperor’s title? Although the 
divisio speaks of empire and kingdom (imperium vel regnum) (Divisio 
regnorum, c. 5, 128), no solution of this problem is brought forth. There was no 
precedent to this central legal issue and, moreover, the conflict with Byzance 
stemming from Charlemagne’s coronation 800 was still pending15. Counterfac-
tual thinking concerning this difficult political and legal issue might involve 
questions concerning “What if ... there had been a reaction of Byzance?” In the 
case of the Byzantine emperor denying Charlemagne the right to the title, what 
would have happened? In such a case, the legal experts of both sides would 
have been busy, each denying the other side’s legitimacy. Solving the problem 
by war would have been risky for both parties, given their respective size and 
power. Furthermore, such as far-reaching conflict might, as a side-effect, been 
utilised by different parties for their own ends. A more practical solution might 
have been to simply ignore the Byzantine emperor’s votum. Also, a third power 
would have to be considered – the Caliphate. Not in vain had Charlemagne sent 
a legacy to the court of Harun al-Rashid before 800. Would Harun-al Rashid 
have stayed indifferent, given the case of a hypothetical war, or have sided with 
either the Eastern or the Western emperor? Both alliances imply a considerable 
risk for all participants. But, staying neutral in the case of a war between the 
Eastern and Western emperor would have been difficult, especially with regard 
to all party’s economic interests in the Mediterranean region being at stake.  
The second set of counterfactuals is focussed on the problem “What if 
...there had been a legal solution concerning the emperor’s title (nomen im-
perii)?” There might have been two possible solutions: giving the title to one of 
the emperor’s sons, thus proclaiming one privileged heir, or, forfeiting the title. 
Giving away an instrument of power once acquired hardly fits in with the col-
lective mentality of Medieval rulers, although there have been serious doubts 
concerning the impact of the concept on the Frankish elites (cf. Boshof 1996, 
86, 88; Fichtenau 1949, 55ff.). Thus, in spite of all legal concepts, the nomen 
imperatoris might have been divided. Although the pragmatic adaptation of 
new concepts into existing political practice is a common feature of Medieval 
society, this would be a far-reaching speculation. Raising one of the three sons 
                                                             
15  The question was and is disputed. Whereas Hägermann (Hägermann 1975, 287 ff.) claims 
that the Emperor’s title was left out because the understanding between the three brothers 
was not to be endangered, Boshof gives the interpretation that Charlemagne left this prob-
lem open to be capable of changing the divisio, if necessary (Boshof 1996, 86). 
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into a privileged position would have been dangerous and quite likely have 
ended in an alliance of the two excluded sons against their brother and/or their 
father. Dissatisfied factions of the empire’s magnates would have utilised the 
conflict for their own ends. This would have meant even more military con-
flicts in a time when the frontiers of the Frankish empire were not uncon-
tested16. Leaving the question open might have been the most sensible course 
of action.  
4. Crisis and Decline 
The years before Charlemagne’s death in 814 somehow blemish the image of 
the “great ruler”. Apart from personal losses, much within and outside the 
realm went amiss. In the narrative sources, an atmosphere of impeding change 
(or even brooding disaster) is created by the mention of an extraordinate num-
ber of supernatural signs. The Vita Karoli Magni contains a moving but none-
theless gloomy description of an old king shortly before his death, losing the 
symbols of kingship during a fall from his battle-horse17. The question if astro-
nomical phenomena like eclipses or comets were, at the time, seen as forebod-
ing unlucky times cannot be attended to here. But there were in fact grave 
problems which could lead to gloomy narrations. In 807, due to unfavourable 
climatic conditions, a famine broke out which exceeded the boundaries of 
commonplace local misharvests. While regional famines and diseases were 
common enough and did not bring about political change, overregional events 
of this sort might provoke problems and push over the established order (Schu-
bert 2006, 38 ff.). Groups or individuals in conflict with the ruler might seek 
advantage therein. Furthermore, the Danish invasions reached another peak18.  
                                                             
16  For instance, apart from the Danish raids, the last victory over the Saxons was in 840, 
meaning that – given the length of the conflict – there would have been oppositional groups 
waiting for a chance to strike back.  
17  According to Eginhard, there were signs in the sky, a building at Aachen collapsed, a bridge 
over the Rhine Charlemagne had built burned down. The narrative deals explicitly with the 
loss of symbols of the kingship: before his last expedition against the Danes, Charlemagne 
was thrown off his horse and lost the fibulae of his cloak and his lance; his sword-belt was 
torn. The old man had to be helped up by his servants. Furthermore, his palace at Aachen 
was subject to several earthquakes, the beams of the buildings he was staying in creaked 
incessantly, etc. Several months before he died, the inscription KAROLUS PRINCEPS (The 
Prince Karl) in his church at Aachen began to fade, the word PRINCEPS became com-
pletely illegible (Eginhard, Vita, c. 33).  
18  For a summary of the problems, see Ganshof 1971, 240 ff. 
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5. 810-814 
The divisio regnorum was rendered invalid by the deaths of Karl the Younger 
and Karlmann/Pippin in 811 and 81019. Given the importance of securing royal 
and imperial succession, it is surprising that Charlemagne did not directly react 
to the changed conditions. Only in September 813, a group of magnates led by 
Eginhard convinced him to have his son Louis crowned emperor (Boshof 1996, 
86 ff.). Charlemagne, having been ill for some time, died shortly afterwards on 
January 28th, 814. The reasons for this temporal lapse remain unclear. Albeit 
the Western Emperor’s title was not acknowledged by Byzance until 812, when 
Charlemagne was proclaimed Basileus by a Byzantine embassy (Classen 1986, 
602 ff.), waiting for the acceptance of Byzance does not seem to be the main 
reason. Given the usual dynamics of his politics, it might be guessed that Char-
lemagne would not have let 12 years pass without pressing the political solu-
tion of a problem he deeply cared about. 
The coronation followed the Byzantine rite (Boshof, 1996, 88), the son be-
ing crowned by his father. The lay magnates and high clergy present conceded 
and acclaimed the new emperor according to Frankish legal tradition. After the 
coronation, the participants attended mass together. There is no mention of big 
festivities afterwards, as might be expected (Becher 2000, 116). In such a case, 
pomp and ostentation accompanying political acts cannot be seen with the eyes 
of the modern observer for whom they are rather unspecified and unclear “sym-
bols of status” with no legal meaning of their own. Legitimacy, especially in 
the important political contexts of royal succession, did not, like today, base on 
the written word as the vehicle of “right” procedure. Legitimacy was produced 
by the “right way” of doing something, in this case an inauguration. Even if 
most ritual details of an inauguration in the 9th century remain unknown 
(Schramm 1954, 311), the greatest ostentation and the largest audience possible 
would have to be expected. Early medieval ostentation had a crucial legitimis-
ing function. Sparse pomp could easily mean sparse legitimacy. That the lack 
of ostentation could be due to Charlemagne’s poor health thus seems highly 
improbable. But, could pompous festivities have provoked those who were 
dissatisfied with the course of events? If so, the fear of powerful oppositional 
groups must have been significant.  
Another aspect deviates strikingly from the ordinary: After the ceremony, 
Charlemagne sent his son back to Aquitaine despite being gravely ill. The 
expected behaviour in such a case would have been to stay close and be present 
at his father’s deathbed. This has been seen indicating a strained relationship 
between father and son (Boshof 1996, 86 ff.). There are more hints that Louis’s 
and his father’s characters and likings were quite different and that they did not 
                                                             
19  In spite of the suspicions which easily come to mind in such a situation, there is no hint at 
foul play.  
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like each other too much20. Again, the analysis of these a-typical events in an 
issue of central political importance can be furthered by employing counterfac-
tuals. “What if ... the coronation had taken place as was to be expected and 
Louis had stayed at his father’s side until he died?” Both aspects hint at deeply-
rooted problems concerning Louis’s succession. Even as the contemporary 
sources, as usual, stress the harmony of all parties involved, the issues they 
leave out are telltale enough. What happened to the followers of Karl the 
Younger and Karlmann/Pippin after 810/811? Where were Charlemagne’s 
natural sons Drogo, Hugo and Theoderic?, and: which were the interests of 
Charlemagne’s powerful advisors, his cousins Adalhard of Corbie and Wala? 
The answers to these questions can only be guessed. Moreover, given the con-
temporary social functions of ostentation, conspicuous consumption and the 
production of political consent: might the ostentation to be expected in a 
“usual” ceremony have led to problems with one of those groups? Might the 
invitation not have been followed by all too many of the realm’s magnates, 
who, when in discord with the ruler and his policy, would have recurred to the 
general practice of showing dissent: staying away (Althoff 1997, 60 ff.)?  
5. Charlemagne’s later years: the discrepancy of research 
Louis the Pious succeeded his father in 814. But, although Thegan claims that 
the succession was uncontested (Thegan Vita, c. 8), the Astronomus’ Vita hints 
at a dangerous situation when the loyalty of Wala and others after the death of 
Charlemagne seemed far from certain21. The description of the events the As-
tronomus gives us is a typical example for the style of the written sources of 
the time. Here, counterfactual questions are a valuable tool of analysis. The 
counterfactuals to be employed here are “What if ... Wala had succeeded in 
pulling the majority or a significant part of the Frankish aristocracy to his 
side?”, or even: “What if ... the magnates had not accepted Louis by granting 
him the ceremony of adventus, one of the central symbols of a ruler’s legiti-
                                                             
20  For instance, whereas Charlemagne enjoyed the Frankish oral tradition and ordered it to be 
written down (Eginhard, Vita, c. 29), according to Thegan, Louis despised them (Thegan, 
Vita, c. 19). The latter also was not overfond of the festivities he was obliged to hold and 
did not even laugh at the jokes of the artists and jesters (ibid.), whereas his father enjoyed 
these diversions but – a-typically for the time – frowned on inebriety going along with such 
occasions. (Eginhard, Vita, c. 24).  
21  The Astronomus’s narrative tells of wide-spread fears of Wala, who had been very close to 
Charlemagne, acting against Louis. Wala journeyed to Louis and commended himself be-
fore Louis even reached Aachen His example was followed by many Frankish nobles (As-
tronomus Vita, c. 21). Given the usual style of contemporary written sources, this episode 
might hint at a potential crisis of state. Wala would have been aware of the suspicion nursed 
against him. The only chance he stood was to react as he did. The behaviour of the nobles 
leaves open several options: Did they follow Wala’s example only after having waited if 
Louis’ss succession was to be uncontested?, or: “What if .. Wala had stayed put?” 
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macy, or, if they had ignored Louis’s orders to wait for him where they were?” 
Most likely, a crisis of state would have emerged, which would have been all 
the more severe, as the designated ruler had not yet been inaugurated. This 
conclusion is consistent with the harsh measures Louis took against Adalhard 
of Corbie, Wala and his natural brothers22.  
The rule of Louis the Pious has long been seen as an age of decay. Charle-
magne’s life work, the Carolingian Empire, broke apart under an unfit ruler and 
his feuding sons. Louis, after practically having been deposed by being left by 
his troops on the battlefield against his son Lothar in 833, was subjected to 
penance (thus being deprived of his idoneity) by his clergy. The infighting of 
his sons and their followers broke out because of his second wife Judith and her 
role in overthrowing the Ordinatio imperii of 81723 to include her son, the later 
Charles the Bald, as a successor24. Recent research (Boshof 1996, 256 ff.), as 
well as the older works of Ganshof (Ganshof 1971, 240 ff.) and Fichtenau 
(Fichtenau 1949, 211 ff.) have contributed to the rehabilitation of Louis. There 
is an increasing number of historians25 who, in their analysis of Charlemagne, 
differ from the image of the “Beacon of Europe”/Pharus Europae (Poeta Saxo, 
226). Obviously, there was a lot amiss in his father’s realm when Louis suc-
ceeded in 814. Here, the central question is: why did Charlemagne’s sons not 
revolt against their father like his grandsons did against theirs, or, like grown-
up sons were known to do? Of course, the Carolingian sources play down each 
and every action against or dissatisfaction with the emperor. This does not 
necessarily mean that the coexistence between the three brothers Karl, 
Karlmann/Pippin and Louis has been harmonic. Moreover, there are only con-
temporary biographies of Louis the Pious which (despite all formalisms em-
ployed therein) outline the personality of their object. Due to the lack of 
sources, his brothers do not surface as individuals. Were Karl and 
Karlmann/Pippin too involved in warfare in their respective subkingdoms to 
undergo the military risk of revolting against a father who had proved extraor-
dinarily successful in this field? Did the wars in Italy and against the Danes 
provide them with enough prestige, so they could quietly await the demise of 
their old father? The considerable risk of revolting against an emperor known 
for his ruthless politics could be avoided by simply waiting him out. Formulat-
ing counterfactual questions from the angle of Louis the Pious’s sons illumi-
                                                             
22  Adalhard was banned to Noirmoutiers, Wala left politics and entered the monastery of 
Corbie, Drogo, Hugo and Theoderic were kept under close surveillance at their brother’s 
court (Boshof 1996, 94).  
23  The Ordinatio imperii specified the inheritances of Louis’s sons. Although the realm was 
divided up according to Frankish legal tradition, the nomen imperii was to go to the eldest 
son Lothar. 
24  The wicked image of Judith that some sources draw has recently been corrected, cf. Koch 
2005.  
25  Cf. the works of Peter Godman, Janet Nelson, Michael Richter and Matthias Becher.  
 197
nates another aspect. “What if ... Louis the Pious’s sons had had only a short 
time to wait for the demise of an old king?” They might or might not have 
taken action against him. And – reversing the point of view once more: “What 
if ... the sons of Charlemagne and Hildegard had suddenly been faced by a 
new-born brother whose powerful and politically well-connected mother was 
fixed on throwing over the existing testament for her offspring?” They would 
have been far from content and in all probability would have tried to reinstate 
the status quo ante. Obviously, there was much more at stake for the three 
older sons of Louis the Pious than for his brothers before 810/811.  
7. Again: “What if ... Charlemagne’s other two sons had 
survived their father?” 
Charlemagne was powerful enough to ensure the Divisio regnorum of 806 to be 
respected. But, had Karl and Karlmann/Pippin, with or without Louis, decided 
to utilise their father’s old age and declining health to deposit him, they might 
have stood a chance. In such a scenario, the magnates could be reasonably 
expected to side with the powers-to-be. The risk of such an action could have 
been minimised by a joint course of at least two of the brothers. Individual 
action of either son would rather have resulted in infighting. But most conflicts 
emerged after a king’s death, when alliances were overthrown and many loyal-
ties questioned26. At this point, several scenarios seem possible or even prob-
able. Karl and Karlmann/Pippin, like their ancestors Pippin III. and Karlmann 
might have joined forces to deprive Louis of Aquitaine, only to transfer the 
latent structural conflict between the two of them to a later date. The outcome 
of this hypothetical conflict between the remaining two brothers would have 
depended on how many powerful magnates each of them would have been able 
to pull over to their side – and keep them there.  
The probability of scenarios depends on profound analysis of political prac-
tices in the eighth and ninth centuries. Before this background, some scenarios 
seem quite impossible. Despite the threat the Danish invasions posed at the end 
of Charlemagne’s reign, a Danish conquest and the resulting re-distribution of 
the political chances of the aristocracy appears highly improbable. Also, direct 
interference of Byzance in the questions of royal succession, like under 6th and 
7th century Merovingian kings, seems out of the question despite the un-
doubted affront of Charlemagne’s claim to the title of Roman Emperor in 800. 
This case, like the scenario above, would lack the conditio sine qua non of 
                                                             
26  The first phase of succession could be dangerous because the new king had to summon all 
his people to confirm existing privileges and renew the oaths of fidelity and the commenda-
tions which had been given – not to the abstract office of king – but to the person of his 
predecessor.  
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Early Medieval rulership: it had to be based on the consent of a significant part 
of the magnates, be they clerics or laymen. On the other hand, hard conflicts 
about the succession between brothers are highly probable. This conflict might 
either result in eliminating one rival and his family, or even in breaking apart a 
hugely expanded empire which had already become increasingly difficult to 
rule under a charismatic leader, let alone his sons. What the role of other rela-
tives, for instance Charlemagne’s powerful cousins Wala and Adalhard, might 
have been in these conflicts, can only be speculated upon. Leaving aside all 
further guesses, if Charlemagne’s two other sons had survived him, bets are 
solid that they might have been the ones bringing about the division of the 
Carolingian empire. 
The example of Charlemagne’s succession has shown clearly that, in addi-
tion to other (interdisciplinary) instruments of mediaevistic research, working 
with counterfactuals can drastically improve scientific results. The counterfac-
tual questions asked, often reached a point where, due to the lack of sources, 
definite answers cannot be given. But, developing probable or less probable 
scenarios, or even formulating counterfactual questions from different point of 
views, has changed the interpretation of events. The formulation of counterfac-
tual questions, like the formulation of any research question without extensive 
knowledge of the subject, can, however, easily lead into anachronistic specula-
tion. This happens when the researcher takes modern categories for granted and 
intemporal. As a result, Charlemagne is integrated into a national background 
which had not existed in the 8th and 9th centuries by scientists who take na-
tionalist categories for being self-evident. On the other hand, the very absurdity 
of scenarios based on clearly anachronistical questions, can serve as a safe-
guard against biased thinking.  
This might be illustrated by yet another example comparing Charlemagne 
and his son Louis the Pious: the use of writing and written administration. In 
retrospect, Charlemagne was far more successful a politician than his son. He 
mastered quite a few highly critical situations and succeeded in fixing his suc-
cession according to his wishes. The latter was accomplished during a phase of 
duress and frequent invasions by an old ruler, all in itself de-stabilising factors. 
Amongst all the possible interpretations of these problems listed above, written 
administration, a standard modern category of successful rulership has not yet 
been mentioned. Modern perception sees literacy as a basic condition for the 
access to social chances and also of successful administration. Max Weber’s 
theory of rationalisation would not work without written administration. Char-
lemagne, unlike his predecessors, furthered the employment of writing and 
surrounded himself with experts who employed new techniques like capitula, 
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written legal texts27. The later term “Carolingian Renaissance” is funded on the 
novelties in the technique of written administration developed by the experts in 
Charlemagne’s chancellery and schools28. Everything just seems to fit in fine 
with the modern perception of the value of written administration. But – the 
output of legal and administrative texts, like capitula, distinctly increased under 
Louis’s rule. The production of written documents in general, of beautifully 
illuminated texts, of works of art in general, as well as the ruler’s building 
activity reached a peak from 814 until 829 (Boshof 1996, 267). On the con-
trary, even Charlemagne’s friend and panegyrist Eginhard had to concede that 
Charlemagne’s capitula were “few and incomplete” (pauca et incompleta) 
(Eginhard Vita c. 29). With regard to the different research opinions concerning 
the extent and political value of Carolingian writing29, counterfactual questions 
might be formulated like: “Would Charlemagne have suffered severe short-
comings in royal power, if he had not employed written administration?” Here, 
the answer would rather be in the negative. Although both Charlemagne and 
Louis tried to establish these innovative forms of government and administra-
tion, written documents only could serve as instruments of power as long as 
their enforcement was guaranteed by other means: the achievement of a con-
sensus between the actors concerned, or the rigorous and violent exaction of 
the ruler’s will. Upending this question produces a similar answer: “Would 
Louis have not been deposed in 833, if he had enforced the production of 
capitula even more?” Again, the answer is no, no text could have made his 
sons change their behaviour, were it not enforced by direct action. Despite 
strong efforts to establish written techniques, the impact of writing on the prac-
tices of power and rulership in the Early Middle Ages was somewhat limited.  
8. Conclusion 
Counterfactual thinking can form a valuable tool for the medievalist, not only 
in the case of Charlemagne’s succession. Of course, given the little we know 
about Early Medieval society, frequently there might not be enough informa-
tion to even formulate speculative answers for these questions. But asking 
continually “What if ... the course of events had not taken place like this, or: ... 
other actors had been involved?” etc. can break open what is taken for granted 
and thus produce new scientific results. Also, counterfactuals are quite a good 
instrument to prevent ethnocentrisms and anachronisms from distorting hy-
                                                             
27  Although two capitula had already been issued in the name of Pippin III., the use of this 
type of legal writ started to be systematically employed during the rule of Charlemagne and 
his successors.  
28  For a complete evaluation of these novelties as well as the different research opinions on 
the “Carolingian renaissance” cf. McKitterick, 1994, Pohl, 2002.  
29 Cf. the previous note. 
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pothesis and scientific results. On this level, they can even be successfully 
employed to evaluate research beginning with research questions, concepts and 
categories. Apart from these possible uses of counterfactuals for the historian in 
general, counterfactual questions have been proved as a valid instrument for 
research on Early Medieval history on two levels. First, the sparse and distorted 
information the contemporary sources give, needs to be questioned closely. 
Asking the question “What would have happened if ...?”, in addition to other 
methods, is a scientific tool to effectively break open the sources’ surface of 
social harmony and largely uncontested kingship. On this level, counterfactuals 
also can refine other methods of analysis. On a second level, by implying coun-
terfactuals into the analysis of the primary sources, the images historiographic 
research constructs upon historical society can more closely be evaluated. 
Counterfactuals become a tool for the research of the History of Science. In the 
example concerned, the deconstruction of many a thesis of a ruler’s “strength”, 
which are still to a large extent determining the popular image of Medieval 
kingship, will be furnished with an additional set of instruments. But, what is 
more, counterfactuals might also be employed to evaluate the frequent conflicts 
of research opinions. In this field of research, the value of counterfactuals is 
still to be explored.  
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